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Arguments for an extension of Piaget's theory of cognitive development
have been derived from philosophical and historical consideration of modern
natural sciences. Implicit contradictions» which characterize these sciences
as well as common thought» can be systematically apprehended only through a
dialectic reinterpretation. The dialectic basis of Piaget's theory is expressed
in his assimilation-accommodation paradigm. But development is interpreted as
a continuing alienation from this basis culminating in the noncontradictory
thinking of formal operations. Although Piaget's interpretations capture a
rich variety of performances during childhood they fail to represent adequately
the thought and emotions of mature and creative persons. For an interpretation
of adulthood and aging» a return to the dialectic basis is necessary. Such a
reorganization can proceed from any of the four major levels of development.
It introduces intra- and interindividual variations into Piaget's theory.
Individuals may operate simultaneously or in short succession at different
cognitive levels. The ceaseless striving toward formal operations becomes
inappropriate and ineffective for the level of dialectic maturity.
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Natural sciences--not to speak of the behavioral and social sciences--
have been plagued by implicit contradictions. Since Huygens it has been
recognized, for example, that phenomena, such as interference and diffraction,
are best explained by a wave theory of light. However, polarization (at least
prior to Fresnel) is best explained by Newton's corpuscle or omission theory.
Although attempts to synthesize both interpretations have succeeded, notably
in Planck's quantum theory, modern natural scientists have come to accept and
to live with coexistent, contradictory theories. Some have not hesitated to
admit that these inconsistencies are basic properties of nature rather than
insufficiencies in the knowledge acquired. "Wave theory of light and corpuscle
theory are both reliably substantiated through experiments and both represent
unescapable conclusions from experience.. But both contradict each other.•..
Today, we can no longer doubt that the dualism of wave and corpuscle represents
a very general physical lawfulness [Jordan, 1943, pp. 84-85]."
The antagonism between such different interpretations could reach its
distinctiveness only because both groups of scientists succeeded in eliminat-
ing from their experiments the participatory role of the subject. "It is
impossible to deny that, so far, all acquisition of knowledge in physics has,
in principle, aimed at the widest possible separation of processes in the
outer nature and processes in the realm of human sensations [Planck, 1934,
p. 45]." The importance of the subject was unadmittedly retained outside
of the context of experimentation only, namely in the selective preference
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for one theory or the other, and in the selective performance of particular
series of experiments. By separating the subject from the object of these
observations their theories became abstract.
Modern scientists have realized that the activities of the observers are
intimately connected with their scientific investigations. When dealing with
subatomic particles t for example, it is in principle impossible to observe,
with equal precision, both their location in space and their movement in time.
Since each measurement exerts a causal effect upon the process observed, the
investigator is prevented from separating these conditions from the measure-
ments chosen. Both location and movement, Or mass and velocity, have to be
studied in their mutual dependence and in their dependence upon the observations.
This recognition implies nothing else but to admit that the object is influenced
by the subject.
The abstract status of classical natural sciences, for which the theory
of mechanics represents a prototypical example, was achieved through a strict
adherence to the postulate of identity and the rejection of explicit or
implicit contradictions. 2 The laws of classical mechanics--as well as those
of any of the other theories of classical natural sciences--"represent idealiza-
tions at which we derive by considering only those portions of our experience,
in which we can achieve an order with our concepts of space, time, etc .•. [butJ
••• such a conceptualization of a world proceeding in objective space and time
is, again, only an idealization of nature, carried out in the desire to objectify
as much as possible [Heisenberg, 1942, pp. 41 and 94].11
The theory of mechanics was built upon the traditional logic, the most
important property of which is that observations, definitions, or postulates
should be noncontradictory, i.e., A should always equal At but not A at one
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time and B at another. It was inconceivable. for example, that light could
be a wave and a particle at the same time. Only one of these alternatives
could be true.
The issue of identity and contradiction separates Hegel's dialectic logic
from the formal logic of his predecessors, especially Aristotle and Kant.
Hegel compares his own with traditional logic in the following manner: I1But
it is one of the basic prejudices of traditional logic and of common-sense
conception that contradiction is not such an essential and immanent determina-
tion as identity; indeed, if we were to consider a rank order and if both
determinations were to be kept separated, contradiction would have to be
accepted as deeper and more essential. For identity, in contrast to it. is
only the recognition of the single immediate. the dead being; but contradiction
is the source of all motion and vitality; only in so far as something contains
contradiction does it move, has it drive and activity [Hegel, 1969a, p. 545,
own translation]."
The adherence to the principle of identity and noncontradiction character-
izes both the scientists who are founding their inquiries upon the viewpoints
of philosophical realism and those who prefer the experiential basis of
positivism. The former believe that their observations represent the objective
conditions in space and time of the rrreal" world (most commonly within the
Newtonian frame of reference). The observer can err or lack precision and
sophistication but, ultimately, these shortcomings can be overcome and, thus,
"truell answers can be "detected. II The task for the philosophical realists is
not to determine those principles which It ••• we are projecting into things in
order to make them comprehensible and practically accessible to us~ but those
which can be detected by us in the things themselves [Bavink, 1940, p. 273]."
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The positivists do not subscribe to the metaphysical notion of "real"
space and time in which llthings" exist and "objective" processes take place.
They exclusively attend to the sensory-perceptual basis of knowledge and
did not consider it the task of sciences to detect "explanations for processes
in nature but to describe them as simply and as completely as possible. The
genuine object of sciences are only the immediate observations and experiences
themselves [Jordan~ 1935~ p. 37].11 But like the philosophical realists, they
emphasize the need for noncontradictory statements. Thus, the first group
reaches the abstractness of its interpretations through a belief in an objec-
tive world and by its disregard of the subject. The second group emphasizes
the subjective nature of our knowledge but, by clinging to the principle of
noncontradiction, advances toward the same abstract theories as the realists. 3
A dismissal of the principle of identity and noncontradiction synthesizes
both philosophical bases. Any theory derived from such a synthesis will be
concrete rather than abstract. Abstract theories are disengaged from the
observer. Concrete theories take the intimate interdependence between subject
and object into account. By abandoning the principle of identity~ these theories
also allow for the coexistence of different interpretations. Dialectic inter-
penetration of subject and object and of contradictory theories is not only
possible but positively necessary for science and knowledge. However, they
dissolve much of what, hitherto, has been clear and firm.
In the following pages we will demonstrate that dialectic conceptualization
characterizes the origin of thought in the individual and in society. More
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important, dialectic conceptualization represents a necessary synthesis in the
development of thought toward maturity. In particular, we examine Plaget's
theory which, too, depicts cognitive development as originating from a
dialectic basis. But, all of the remaining explications in Piaget's theory
characterize development as a progression toward abstract thought. Thus,
development represents an alienation of the subject from the object and a
denial of contradictions. Since Piaget fails to emphasize that, ultimately,
all thought has to return to its dialectic form, we are led to propose a fifth
stage of cognitive development, the period of dialectic operations. 4
Dialectic Operations
Our introduction relied on the insightful essay by the late Max Wundt
(1949), philosopher and son of Wilhelm Wundt. In particular, we emphasized
the dialectic reinterpretations of coexisting theories, the subject-object
relation, the realism-positivism controversy, and the distinction between
concrete and abstract thought. The dialectic solutions, as proposed by Hegel,
rest upon a reconsideration of the identity principle. It has not been Hegel's
intention (nor is it ours) to dismiss this principle out of hand and once and
for all. For the purpose of special logical constructions, mathematical models
or measurement systems, scientists will rely on it for formal explications.
The blind adherence to the identity principle and~ thus, to classical logic,
hinders, however, the understanding of the contradictory nature of human thought,
especially during its very early stages during maturity and old age.
Hegel's dialectic theory.5 Contradictions. in Hegel's dialectic theory,
are not conditions of error and insufficiencies, but are the most basic property
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of nature and mind. Rational thought (in distinction from reason) separates
different attributes and) then~ by connecting them in a systematic manner, tries
to reconstruct the phenomena (such as those of optics or mechanics, learning or
cognition) in an unequivocal manner. The concurrent acceptance of alternative
theories reduces the unequivocality. But contradiction is not only a principle
applicable to show the supplementary nature of such abstract theories, it is a
necessary condition of all thought.
Every thing is itself and, at the same time, many other things. For
example, any concrete object, such as a crystal~ is itself but is also of many
different properties. By selecting some and disregarding others we might
develop one or another abstract notion (theory) about the crystal, as indeed
the crystallographer, the glassgrinder, the watchmaker, or a housewife will do.
But only when we conceive all properties in their complementary dependencies do
we reach an appropriate, concrete comprehension. But what is, then, the thing
itself? It is the totality of all the different, contradictory notions about
it to which the thing itself stands in contradictory relations. Dialectic
thinking comprehends itself~ the world, and each concrete object in its multi-
tude of contradictory relations. As Lenin would put it many years later:
"Every concrete thing, every concrete something, stands in multifarious and
often contradictory relations to everything else: ergo it is itself and some
other [1929, p. 124]."
Hegel's discussion of I'master and slave" in his Phenomenology of Spirit~
provides another example of dialectic thinking. The master is independent and
therefore enjoys for his own sake; the slave is dependent, he does not partake
in enjoyment but has to carry the load of labor. But the master becomes
dependent upon the labor whereas the slave. through his labor, gains conscious-
ness and, thus, independence. Each side can be described unambiguously and
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without contradiction. Such a description would be abstract, however. Only a
description of both in their mutual relation provides a concrete representation
of the totality without covering up one or the other. Such a description
represents dialectic thought with its intrinsic contradictions.
The dialectic nature of our conceptualization, both in our everyday and
in our scientific efforts, can be demonstrated through numerous other examples.
Concepts like being and becoming, cause and effect, passivity and activity,
structure and transformation cannot be thought of in isolation but only in
their mutual dependence. For additional demonstrations, we turn our attention
to the concepts of element and (simple) relation as well as to those of class
and general relation. All of these have developmental implications which will
be discussed in some of the following sections.
If we conceive of elements as represented by points in a geometrical space
and of simple relations as represented by lines or vectors, we realize their
dialectic interdependence: Points are defined as the intersection of two (or
more) lines; lines are defined as the (shortest) connection between two points.
The same holds for classes and the general relations between them both of which,
according to our interpretations (Riegel, 1970, 1973b), can be deduced from the
former. But here again we are confronted with dialectic ambivalence. On the
one hand, we might derive classes from sets of simple relations, such as the
class of lIactors" and the class of llact ions." Conjoining them, we can, sub-
sequently, define the general relation of "activity, tt i.e., the general relation
of "acting actors." On the other hand, we might consider this general relation-
ship as given. Subsequently, we define the classes of "actors" and "actions"
on the basis of this relationship. In either case, we unravel the interpenetra-
tion of elements and relations as well as those of classes and general relations.
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Thereby~ we derived abstract descriptions; concrete thought considers both
explications in their mutual determination.
On the following pages we will elaborate the implications for developmental
psychology of the notion of dialectic interpenetration and of the dismissal of
the identity principle. In particular t we demonstrate these implications in
regard to the development of logical operations with classes and of linguistic
operations with explicit relations~ i.e' t comparative terms. In a third
section we discuss some of the difficulties encountered when one tries to apply
Piaget's theory to the study of maturity and aging. In a fourth section we
summarize the necessary modification and extension of Piaget's theory of
cognitive development.
Development of logical operations with classes. In considering Piaget's
theory and observations of cognitive development t we recognize its dialectic
basis. This dialecticism is most clearly revealed in the accommodation-
assimilation paradigm leading ,to adaptation and readaptation. Accommodation
denotes the changes of the subject to the object, for example the observing or
eating child. Assimilation denotes the changes of the object to (for the
benefit of) the subject t for example t the shifting into focus of the object
visually searched or the physical and chemical changes of the eaten food. In
the dialectic sense, both accommodation and assimilation are complementary;
they are standing in contradictorYt mutual relation.
While Piaget's theory is based upon such a dialectic foundation, critics
have often wondered how the accommodation-assimilation paradigm is carried
forward into the interpretations of the higher stages of cognitive development.
Undoubtedly Piaget uses this paradigm skillfully and convincingly for depicting
basic biological interactions as well as early cognitive differentiations,
such as those of sucking t grasping, touching t as well as the coordination and
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sequencing of these early schemata. In this regard, Piaget's descriptions
resemble those operations denoted as syncretic by Werner (1926). As soon as
the child reaches the second major period in Piaget's theory, the period of
preoperational intelligence, and as soon as Piaget shifts from a methodology
of observational interpretations to those of experimentation, the dialectic
paradigm of accommodation and assimilation is slowly abandoned or, at least.
disregarded and the interpretations are proposed in terms of traditional logic.
For our discussion of the major periods in Piaget's theory, we rely on
a much simplified interpretation of cognitive development by McLaughlin (1963).
This interpretation deals exclusively with the operation of classes and regards
development as a consecutive addition of dimensions of categorical judgments.
At the sensory-motor period the child recognizes object permanency but is not
yet able to classify within a dimension; he is able to attend to only one
concept at a time. In order to categorize he would need to attend to at least
one other concept or to negate the former, the attended concept.
The sensory-motor child focuses upon distinct singular objects that
happen to corne into his field of attention. Neither does he discriminate
any of these objects against others nor against negative instances of the
same object. For example, the child is able to focus upon a block, but he
does not discriminate this block from beads and marbles or nonblocks in
general. All that he is able to do is to achieve a figure-ground differentia-
tion. The dialectic character of the early form of cognitive operations is
expressed by the fluidity with which the attention of the child might switch
from item to item or from figure to ground and from ground to figure.
The dialectic character is also revealed at the next higher level of
cognitive operations corresponding to Piaget's period of preoperational thought.
-10-
At this level the child attends two concepts simultaneously. Thus he is
able to sort items by color into those that are red and those that are green
or, more generally, into those which show the presence of an attribute. such
as the color red. and those which show its absence, i.e .• nonred. The posi-
tive and negative instances of an attribute are mutually dependent. Red
determines as much that which is not red. as not-red determines red. Both
together define the attribute or dimension of discrimination, i.e., color.
Such a dimension, at different situations or at higher levels of development,
might be contrasted with new alternatives, such as form or materiality.
Moreover, the mutual determination of an instance and a noninstance of one
attribute are not fixed but variable. In one case, red might be contrasted
with all other colors; in another case, red might be contrasted with all
other reddish colors. The determination of the kind and the range of a
dimension is dependent upon extra-attributional and contextual factors.
The discussion of the remaining two developmental periods. the concrete
and the formal operational periods, can be relatively brief. In McLaughlin's
simplified interpretation, the child becomes able to operate simultaneously
with two attributional dimensions and four concepts. or with three attribu-
tional dimensions and eight concepts. Both steps imply important expansions
of the child's conceptualization. At the period of concrete intellectual
operations, for example. the child succeeds in double classifications and
thus can form the logical products A and B. A but not B. B but not A. neither
A nor B. At the period of formal operational thought, still further reaching
expansions occur.
All of these operations could be interpreted in a dialectic form if the
mutual determination of a class and its inverse, i.e., of the classes A and
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non-A, were consistently emphasized. While this seems to be obvious enough
from a theoretical perspective, in the reports of his research observations,
Piaget searches systematically for contradictions in the child's judgments,
and thereby undermines his own dialectic interpretations as well as he de-
grades the dialecticity of the child. Of course, Piaget merely reports
these contradictions and, thus, the dialectically minded reader could use
this information adequately to substantiate his own interpretations, but
since Piaget's theory subsequently progresses to higher and higher levels
at which earlier contradictions are formally resolved, his theory becomes
antidialectic and the progress of the child as described by Piaget is one of
increasing alienation of thought. Through the following examples we will
show the continuing dialectic character of the child's thought and, later on,
we will claim that the older, alienated child, in order to reach maturity,
will have to return to a dialectic basis of thinking.
Piaget's theory of cognitive development as a theory of alienation.
Various research reports (see, for example, Piaget, 1962, 1963, 1965; Piaget &
Inhelder, 1967) provide rich sources for demonstrating the dialectic character
of the child's thought. The following example shows shifts in the identity
concept of a child at an age· of two years seven months: "J. seeing L. in a
new bathing suit, with a cap, J. asked: What's the baby's name? Her mother
explained that it was a bathing costume, but J. pointed to L. herself and
said: But, what's the name of that? (indicating L's face) and repeated the
question several times. But as soon as L. had her dress on again, J. exclaimed
very seriously: It's Lucienne again, as if her sister had changed her identity
in changing her clothes [1962, p. 224].11
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At an early age the child is not embarrassed by his own contradictory
judgments as shown in the following example on a numerical comparison of
sets of items at an age of six years and nine months: "Are there more
wooden beads or more brown ones?--More brown ones.--If we make a necklace
with the wooden beads and a necklace with the brown ones, which would be
longer?--The one with the wooden beads (without hesitating).--Why?--Because
there are the two ext ra white ones [1965, p. 176 J•II
Regardless of whether one attributes these contradictory judgments to
a change in the child's opinion, to a lack of short-term retention, or to
disability to operate simultaneously with two attributional dimensions,
development is seen by Piaget (as well as by almost all developmental psycholo-
gists) as removing these inconsistencies and as reaching toward a coherent,
noncontradictory mode of thinking. These examples also show, however, that
thinking originates from a dialectic basis and, as we will try to demonstrate,
creative and mature thinking returns to its dialectic mode or rather fails
to separate itself clearly and firmly from this foundation.
Additional support for our interpretation comes from a recent study by
Miller (1972) with the specific purpose of examining children's reactions to
the violation of their own expectancies concerning the conservation of weight. 6
Eight- and ten-year-old nonconservers and conservers were studied under con-
ditions where the outcome of the weighing of two clay balls could be over-
ridden by the experimenter thus creating results inconsistent with the
experience of at least the conserving children. Contrary to the investigator's
expectation, observable surprise was infrequent and changes in judgment were
readily made. Contrary to some earlier findings. active resistance to change
was apparent in about half the conservers but older conservers did not show
resistance more often than young conservers.
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Miller derives the interpretation of his findings from Piaget's notion
of the Illogical necessitytl for the persistence of cognitive structures. This
notion, in turn, derives from the concept of disequilibration. If a conflict
is created through new experiences or cognitive changes, the organism tends
to resolve such an incongruity. If such an equilibration is not successfully
achieved, the child, especially the younger one, might simply state his
observation without persistent attempts to consolidate it with his earlier
conceptualization. In Piaget's theory, such a solution represents a regression
toward an earlier level of operation. To us, it indicates that the thoughts
of the child are flexible enough to tolerate and to exist with ambiguities.
Eventually, through alienating training and abstractions, the child will be
induced to consolidate these contradictions for the sake of educationally
accepted interpretations. In principle, however, these contradictions remain
to coexist even within the superimposed structures of later interpretations
as demonstrated in the following report by Zaporozhets and Elkonin (19"71).
These authors asked children to test whether some small objects would
float in a pan filled with water. At about 3 1/2 years of age, a child will
successively propose various alternative reasons whenever his previous answer
becomes incongruous with new experience. Thus, he will switch his interpre-
tation from "It doesntt hold itself on water" (brass disk), to llIt is sma11 11
(needle), to "It doesntt know how to swim." At an age of four to five years,
a child is able to produce compounded answers, e.g., "A splinter swims because
it is little and it is light." Subsequently, he will be faced 1es.s often with
contradictory experience. In emphasizing with Piaget the necessary development
toward abstract and general structures, Zaporozhets and E1konin conclude:
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"The child is so convinced of her own judgment that it is difficult
for her to refute it even in the light of contradictory facts. However,
does it mean then that the child is not aware of the contradictions, that
she ignores reality whenever it does not correspond to her understanding?
The observations show that this is not so [1971, p. 240J. 1I
The interpretations by the Soviet investigators agree with those by
Piaget: The thoughts of the young child are founded upon dialectic contradic-
tions. But increasing with age and experience, he acquires stable structures
that consolidate contradictory evidence into consistent interpretations. In
regard to floating objects, the child, at first, considers either the attribute
small or the attribute light as criterial; later he begins to realize that
objects have to be both small and light at the same time; still later he might
relate their weight to their volume in form of a ratio, and he might consider
whether the objects are hollow or solid, the type of liquid they~e placed
on, etc.
But as the child apprehends increasingly complex structures which con-
solidate all the contradictory evidence experienced, the different concrete
observations remain to coexist, i.e., a small object floating, a small object
sinking, a heavy object floating, a heavy object sinking, etc. Each new
situation demands transformation of the experience into the consolidated
structure. Each new situation remains contradictory as each thought remains
tied to its dialectic basis. As for a student puzzled by an ambiguous multiple
choice item (and which item fails to be ambiguous), it matters little for an
understanding of the student's thinking whether or not he finally finds the
Hcorrect" answer; what matters are the ambiguity and the contradictions that
he experiences. Thinking, in the dialectic sense, is the process of transforming
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contradictory experience into momentary stable structures. These structures
consolidate the contradictory evidence but do not represent thinking; they
merely represent the products of thinking.
Development of linguistic operations with relations. Recently, several
studies explored the acquisition and use of comparative terms, such as lImore ll
and "less" or Ittall," "taller" and "tallest." These investigations have been
conducted and summarized either by emphasizing a linguistic (Clark, 1970) or
a perceptual-cognitive basis (Huttenlocher & Higgins, 1971). Undoubtedly,
the study of comparative terms is intimately related to Piaget's work. In
particular, his interpretations of conservation have been criticized for
failing to take account of the child's ability to operate and comprehend such
terms as "more," "less,n "same," etc. (Griffiths, Shantz & Sigel, 1967;
Donaldson & Balfour, 1968; Bickford & Looft, 1972).
According to the available evidence, simplified to a considerable extent,
the following stages in the development of comparative terms may be dis-
tinguished. At levell, when the child is producing single words only, ex-
pressions such as lImore" are sometimes used by the child as imperative demands
without comparative implications. Paraphrasing his expression, the child
seems to say "I want this here!,1 At level 2, when the child operates
simultaneously with two terms, he might use such words as "more ll in an
absolute, dichotomizing manner, contrasting it with lIno t more ll but not imply-
ing a gradiation of magnitudes. At level 3, when the child operates simulta-
neously with three terms, true transitivity and, subsequently, comparativity is
established. For instance, the child might apply terms like "small, medium,
tall" or "tall, taller, tallest-" By dropping off either one of the extreme
items of such a series, e.g., A < B < C, he is able to extend it without
limitation.
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Level 3 represents an important step in an additional sense. All
previous comparisons implied absolute anchor points. In one-term expressions,
the condition and desire of the speaker himself serves as an absolute point
of reference. In the two-term comparison, the expression "more" serves as
the positive instance; "not more" represents merely its negation. At level 3,
the anchor point becomes variable. Applying a spatial representation, usually
the left hand term, as in "tall, taller, tallest,1t serves. such a function, but
can always be modified by adding a new element, such as "less tall,tT or--
more radically--by extending the sequence into the opposite direction, i.e.,
"tall,1t "less tall," "least tall."
At level 4, when the child operates simultaneously with four terms, he
ought to be able to make comparisons between two dichotomized variables and
perform class multiplications such as between "wide and narrow vs. short and
tall." This performance is one of the logical prerequisites for conservation
tasks. Similar performances, ·although they do not represent any new form of
operation, consist of hierarchical comparisons. For example, the child might,
first, classify objects into large and small items and, then, subdivide each
class in the same manner. This operation, when executed repeatedly, may
result in a series in which all items are ordered transitively. Finally, we
might expect level 5 and level 6 children to compare simultaneously items
along three or more dimensions.
Our discussion demonstrated the use and development of comparatives
within a conceptual framework related to Piaget's developmental model,
especially to the simplified version proposed by McLaughlin (1963). In
general, it related to the traditional logic of classes and relations. But
-17-
development does not only consist of continuous refinements of gradiating
comparisons nor does it only consist of the compounding of an ever larger
number of dimensions, but also involves an increasing relativization of
standards in comparative expressions. The necessity of applying alternate
evaluations in judging. for example, some event as fortunate but, from
another person's view, as unfortunate, characterize.s already the behavior
of older children in role playing activities. It characterizes more clearly
the mediating and compromising operations of adult persons, as well as--in
a general sense--modern scientific notions.of the relativity of movements
in space.
If an object is fast, when compared within a fixed system of coordinates,
but slow, when compared with another moving object, we recognize, once more,
the dialectic principle of contradiction. This principle implies that a
thing has a given quality and, at the same time, does not have it. In
regard to comparatives, the statement that something is tall and at the
same time small, namely when viewed within two different frames of reference,
is equally characteristic of mature judgments. Such a statement cannot be
captured easily within a logic of classes and relations.
Dialectic thinking emphasizes the interdependence of form and content.
In its narrow sense, it deals with the interrelatibnship between methods and
results, in its most general sense, between subject and object. As one person
pronounces a judgment, he externalizes a standard which will direct and modify
another person's judgment, which, once it too has been pronounced, will
produce further modifications. Thus, these interactions set a process in
motion which is in continuous flux and only temporarily at rest, namely at
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those moments in which a pronouncement takes place. Such a process of evaluation
and reevaluation characterizes the thoughts and judgments of adult persons.
In regard to aged persons it has been proposed that processes of simplifi-
cation and rigidification have altered their mode of' conceptualization (and
action). But such an evaluation holds only if their thinking is considered to
be preceded by all four periods of Piaget's theory and compared against the
standards set for the last of these periods, i.e., of formal operations. If
dialectic thinking emerges directly from any of the earlier levels of operations,
an interpretation of cognitive aging will result which is free of the negative
and prescientific notion of deficiency. Uncritical adherence to traditional
educational and academic goals have made us firmly believe, however, that
development has always to proceed through all of the four periods; the further
a person advances in his progression, the more successful his development is
considered to be. The option to be proposed, which allows that dialectic or
mature thinking might emerge from anyone of the succeeding periods, opens new
perspectives for the study and understanding of adult thinking and successful
aging (Riegel, 1972 a, c). As the following review reveals, previous investi-
gations of cognitive and linguistic development have failed to provide adequate
interpretations.
Cognitive changes during adulthood and aging. Thus far only two studies
of normal aged subjects have been conducted with tasks taken from the rich
repertoire of Piagetian investigations. A few have been made with senile
older subjects by de Ajuriaguerra (see Hooper, 1972); several others are in
preparation (see Papalia, 1972).
The two studies reported (Sanders, Laurendeau & Bergeron, 1966; Kominski
& Coppinger, 1968) investigated the conservation of surface areas by means of
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two green cardboards, described as meadows, on which two cows could graze.
By placing blocks in various positions upon the cardboards, subjects were
asked whether equal amounts of grass were available to the cows. According
to the evidence obtained, older adults do not conserve area as we would expect
them and as older childr"en do. They rather seem to have regressed to judgments
based on their immediate perceptual impressions, much like those exhibited by
younger children.
These results raise the puzzling question of the disappearance of
personal knowledge. Let us consider the knowledge of the conservation of
matter. Is it conceivable that a person, once he has realized that an
amount of liquid remains the same when poured from one beaker into another
one of different shape, can ever lose this insight? Don't we always keep
knowing what we know?
In one of the two theoretical discussions on cognitive changes during
adulthood and aging, Flavell (1970) argues for the "disappearance of
knowledge" under conditions of serious neurophysiological damage. According
to available information, such changes are not necessarily affecting all
aging persons to a sufficient extent. Arguments against the "disappearance
of knowledge" are based upon the distinction between competence and per-
formance as introduced into linguistics by Chomsky and as translated into
cognitive developmental psychology by Flavell and Wohlwill (1969), though
with an emphasis congruent with the traditional distinction in psychology of
theoretical constructs and observable behavior.
For Chomsky, competence refers to the knowledge about language; it is
intuitive, immediate, and ideal. Performance refers to the execution of
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linguistic tasks; it is acquired t incomplete t and concrete. This distinction
reflects (as well as it fails to overcome) the mind-body dualism of Descartes:
in its idealistic extension it argues for the immutability of competence or
knowledge; in its mechanistic extension it proposes that competence is innate.
Chomsky himself has stayed somewhat aloof from these elaborations. If
he were to stress more strongly the interactional, i.e., the transformational
aspects of his model t he could escape from these two traps. He would still
fail t however t to account for the interactions of the organism with the
cultural-historical conditions of the environment and, moreover. of the
dialectic changes of the individual and society.
A second theoretical discussion, focusing upon the transition in cog-
nitive operations between adolescence and adulthood, has been published by
Piaget himself (1972). Here Piaget seems to weaken his earlier interpreta-
tions by giving more attention to individual and societal differences in
speed of development, developmental diversification. and professional
specialization.
OriginallYt the four major periods in the cognitive development of the
child were regarded by Piaget as universal progressions through which all
children would move at about the same pace. Studies of cross-cultural and
subcultural variations have often failed to confirm such an interpretation
and led Piaget to suggest that the speed of progression is not the same
under all social conditions t but may produce retardation in deprived and
accelerations in stimulating surroundings. Differences between groups are
especially marked at the later periods of development; during the early
periods t the progression seems to be most uniform.
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Developmental diversifications in regard to types of tasks also seem
to affect least the early developmental periods. Even operations that are
not successfully performed before an age of 10 or 12 years, such as conserva-
tion of matter, weight, or volume, seem to have universal significance; few
differences have been observed across cultures or social groups. When
dealing with the propositional logic of fo~al operations, however, marked
differences exist. Most of Piaget's tasks use constructs from mathematics,
physics, or chemistry. Probably, such topics are not only inadequately
handled by subjects from lesser developed countries, but also well trained
students in advanced countries, having other areas of specialization, e.g.,
business, medicine, or law, often fail to do well on them •
. Professional specialization produces variations within a culture. Here,
Piaget argues that carpenters, plumbers, or mechanics might be well able to
apply formal operations within the contexts of their specific occupational
activities but might fail in laboratory settings and with material unfamiliar
and irrelevant to them. Thus, factors of interests and motivations, practical
and social significance codetermine operations, originally thought of as being
universal qualities.
Piaget's statements on the transition from adolescence to adulthood
provide concessions to individuals and social groups who Iffai1" to progress
all the way through to the elaborated structures of formal thought. But his
statements neither indicate the cultural-historical implications of such
"failures" nor d<? they elaborate in positive terms the types of intellectual
operations which "failing" individuals will have to choose or with which they
are bound to end up. Piaget describes cognition and its development as it
"ought to be" and, therefore, his interpretations have been criticized as a
cognitive theory of "law and order" (Wilden, 1972).
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Piaget's concessions in regard to individual and social differences are
most appropriate. It has never been shown convincingly that the highest level
of operation, i.e., formal operational intelligence, characterizes the thinking
of mature adults. Only under the most exceptional conditions of logical
argumentations and scholastic disputes is it conceivable that a person would
engage in such form of thinking. In his daily activities logics and opera-
tions of much lower power will be applied. Indeed, even in their scientific
activities researchers will very rarely engage in the,propositional logic of
~
the fourth period in Piaget's theory and, for example, systematically calculate
all possible outcomes in their search for a solution. Such forms of thinking
merely provide the last straw in the process of a scientific inquiry which is
applied after intuitive thought is exhausted. Creative scientific activities
are dominated by playful manipulations of contradictions and by conceiving
issues integratively which have been torn apart by formal operational thinking.
The same type of intuitive conquest characterizes even more appropriately the
performance at levels below those of formal operational intelligence.
For all these reasons, Piaget's theory describes thought in it~ aliena-
tion from its creative, dialectic basis. It represents a prototype reflecting
the goals of our higher educational system which, in turn, are reflecting
the nonartistic and noncreative aspects in the intellectual history of western
man (Riegel, 1972b, d). Although, Piaget's theory is founded on a dialectic
basis, it fails to make the transition from the formal intellectualism of
Kant to the concrete dialecticism of Hegel. Thus, his theory is not only
incapable of interpreting mature thinking but, in his interpretation, also
the cognitions 6f children (increasing with age) lose their dialectic character
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and, thus, their creative features. A commitment to Hegel enables us to
reinterpret Piagetls theory with due consideration of mature and creative
thinking. It leads us to an extension and modification of Piaget's model
of cognitive progression.
A modified model of cognitive development. In a recent publication
(Riegel, 1972e), we discussed three models of qualitative, developmental
changes. These models were derived from the earlier work by Van den Daele
(1969). In both publications, Piaget's theory of cognitive development was
considered to represent the simplest of all three models, the single sequence
model. In this model qualitatively different sets of operations or behavior
succeed each other in temporal sequence; no provisions for difference in
progression between persons or between skills were made nor any statements on
the transition and accumulation of behavior across stages. Undoubtedly, this
representation oversimplifies the richness of Piaget's theory but, at the
\
present time, there are insufficient reasons for assigning either one of the
other models, the multiple sequence or the complex sequence model, to represent
Piagetls theory.
In view of such an assignment the question arises as to what happens, at
later stages, to the behavior or operations acquired and representative of
the earlier stages? Are the schemata of the sensory-motor period lost or are
they modified and transformed into those of the preoperational and of the
higher periods? Moreover, is it conceivable that an individual operates
simultaneously at different levels of cognition; perhaps, switching back and
forth between them or choosing one for one area of activity and another for
another area?
Recently Furth (1973) has maintained that Pi.aget does not "pretend that
stages of thinking reached in one domain will necessarily be found in the
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thinking of the same person in another domain [po 8]." But Piaget does not
state explicitly the conditions under which such sWitching across stages
might or has to occur. Even if we consider the simplified interpretation by
McLaughlin (1963), we fail to derive any definite conclusion. The progression
depicted in this model represents, as we have seen, a successive increase in
the number of attributional dimensions and, thus, in the number of concepts with
which a child operates simultaneously. But if a child at the level of pre-
operational thinking categorizes items according to the presence or absence of
one attribute, is he, then, also able to dismiss the attributional dimension
altogether and to conceive items "as such" without any categorizing efforts,
i.e., in the manner of the sensory-motor child?
Presumably the further the child has advanced in his development, the
harder it will be to Tlregresstl to the "naive" mode of early conceptualization.
For this reason, the growth of cognitive organization, as depicted in any
of these models, represents an alienation from original thought. Dialectic
operations represent a further step forward and, at the same time, a return
to early thinking which, in the opinion of many writers (e.g., Stern, Werner,
Freud, Zeininger, Levi-Strauss, et al.), is dialectic in nature.
As shown in Figure 1, we propose that an individual at any developmental
level may directly progress to its corresponding mode of dialectic operations J
reaching thereby a mature stage of thinking. This provision introduces
interindividual variation at the level of maturity. Persons might reach
dialectic maturity without ever having passed through the period of formal
operations or even through that of concrete operations. This provision also
Insert Figure 1 about here
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introduces intraindividual variation. The skills and competence in one area
of concern, for instance in sciences. might be of the type of formal dialectic
operations; those in a second area, for instance in everyday business trans-
actions, might be of the type of concrete dialectic operations; those in a
third area, for instance in artistic activities, might be of the type of
preoperational dialectic intelligence; finally, those of intimate personal
interactions might be of the sensory-motor and therefore of the original
dialectic type.
In his discussion of equilibration and disequilibration, Piaget touches
most explicitly upon the issue of optional, multi-level operations. At the
same time, his discussion reveals clearly that his conception of development
is one of consecutive alienation. According to Piaget as well as to Lewin
(1954), organisms inherently tend toward equilibrated states. Disequilibrium
represents conflict and contradiction which the organism tries to overcome
through his activities. The state of disequilibrium is especially marked
prior to the transitions from anyone into the next higher levels of operations.
If Piaget admits--as Furth has declared--that an organism might have
implicit or explicit options to operate at different stages of thinking,
dependent upon the area of activity with which he happens to be concerned at
a particular time, the emphasis upon the principle of eqUilibration is
weakened if not abandoned. Any concurrent or closely successive operations
at different developmental levels ought to create by themselves a state of
conflict which ought to be equilibrated. Such an equilibration can only mean
the progression to the higher and later developmental level of operation.
In other words, the option for multi-level operations contradicts Piaget's
notion of equilibration since it reintroduces dialectic conflict; the emphasis
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upon equilibration would tend to resolve this conflict at the expense of the
thinking at the earlier stage. Our own modification recognizes dialectic
conflicts and contradiction as a fundamental property of thought. In contrast
to Piaget, we maintain that at the levels of dialectic operations at maturity,
the individual does not necessarily equilibrate these conflicts, but is ready
to live with these contradictions; stronger yet, the individual accepts these
contradictions as a basic property of thought and creativity.
Conclusion
The purpose of our discussion was to reintroduce dialecticism into
Piaget's theory of cognitive development. According to our interpretation,
Piaget's theory is founded upon dialectic thinking but, successively, each
higher level of operation leads to further alienation from this original mode
of thinking. Dialectic operations represent mature thought to which an
individual might progress from anyone of the four stages in Piaget's theory,
i.e., without necessarily progressing first through all four of them in their
proper order. This option to operate simultaneously or in short succession at
different levels also implies that an individual might perform in one area of
concern at one level of thinking and in another area at another level. It
implies contradiction and is dialectic in character.
Our modification and extension of Piaget's theory to the level of
dialectic operations is concerned with intrapsychic processes. At other
occasions (Riegel, 1972b, 1973a), we have called attention to the need for
expanding Piaget's theory in at least two other directions.
First, the interaction between psychic activities and their biological
basis need to be explored more fully. Undoubtedly, Piaget's orientation is
basically a biological one but it is evolutionary-systematic rather than
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analytic-experimental. In our opinion~ the modern version of Pavlov's
reflexology comes closest to fulfilling our expectations by exploring an
interactive. dialectical model which relates psychic activities to their
biological and (in its narrower explication) material foundation.
Second, the interaction between psychic activities and the cultural-
historical conditions need to be explored more fully (see Meacham, 1972). For
Piaget, the individual, through his own activities~ creates his conceptual world.
But the activities of and within the environment are disregarded. These activi-
ties exert their effects upon the individual through their specific structures
(which, through ceaseless efforts of mankind have produced widely differing
cultural-historical conditions), as well as through the participatory efforts
of parents~ siblings. teachers (which~ as much as the developing child. ought
to be considered as active organisms). A developmental theory emphasizing
the interactions between psychic activities and those of the cu1tural-
historical conditions has been proposed by Soviet psychologists~ notably
Vigotsky, Luria and Leont'ev. A theory integrating both interaction systems
and, thus, regarding psychic activities and development in their joint
interaction with both inner biological and outer cultural historical condi-
tions has been proposed by S. L. Rubinstein (see Payne, 1968; Riegel, 1972b,
1973a; Wozniak. 1972).
Hegel's dialectic idealism, from which most of our present interpreta-
tions were derived,7 has been followed and superseded by the historical and
dialectic materialism of Marx, Engels. and Lenin. For two reasons it seems
appropriate, however, to wait and contemplate before one were to rush in
following up on these historical developments. First, Hegel's philosophy,
especially his Phenomenology of Spirit, provides an exceptionally rich source
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and a distinct model of the development of the mind both in regard to the
individual and society. To this author's knowledge, Hegel's theory has never
been explored for the purpose of psychological interpretations. Second,
Hegel, much more than the dialectic materialists, has preserved the conception
of an active developing organism, or more precisely, he has proposed a develop-
mental model in which activities (labor) and products (material) remain in
dialectic dependency. It seems a regression, indeed, if we were to abandon
this delicate notion too readily in order to obtain a material underpinning
the utility of which was recognized in a theory of labor, products, and
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FOOTNOTES
lThiS manscript was completed during the author's appointment as a Visiting
Scholar at the Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N. J. The author is
grateful for many constructive comments by Nancy Datan, Walter Emmerich, Jack
Meacham, Ruth Riegel, Lee Van den Daele, and Bill Ward. A sufficient extension
of the manuscript in full justification of their contributions has not yet been
achieved.
2The concept of identity has been expressed in three forms, tradi-
tionally called "laws" of: Identity (p:> p ; if P then p); Contradiction
(~. p ~ P it is false, p and not p); Excluded Middle (tertium non datur)
(p V ~ P P or not p but not both). In a more general sense, the following
interpretations of these "laws fl are given; Identity A term must preserve
the same denotation in all its occurrenceS within a given context. Contradic-
~: A sentence and its negation are not both true. Excluded Middle:
Either a sentence or its negation are true. Traditionally, these "laws of
thought" were regarded as a sufficient foundation for the whole of logic;
Kant's analytical judgments, for example, are those for which the law of
contradiction suffices as proof.
3The adequacy of positivistic thinking for modern natural sciences has
been emphasized by Petzoldt (1912) in his epilogue and extension of Mach's
"Analyse der Empfindungen."
40ur occasional critique of Piaget is exclusively directed toward the
interpretations advanced during his "structural" period of the early 50's
and represented by such books as: The Psychology of Intelligence, and
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The Origin of Intelligence in Children. Our remarks neither concern Piaget's
earlier period of the late 20's which might be called "functional tr and is
represented by a publication such as: The Language and Thought of the Child,
nor his most recent "transformational" period represented by his book
Structuralism. A genetic interpretation of Piaget's work, like that provided
for Aristotle by Wilhelm Jaeger (1923), needs to be written.
5For the preparation of this article, I have relied upon Hegel's
Science of Logic (1929) and his Phenomenology of Mind (1967). As introduc-
tions to Hegel's philosophy, the following books are recommended to the
reader of English: SolI's Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (1969) and
Kaufmann's more extensive work, entitled Hegel: Reinterpretation, Te~t, and
commentary (1966). Finally, Bergmann's discussion (1973) of some developmental
implications of Hegel's philosophy deserves special recommendation.
6Recently, Elkind (1967), Hooper (1969), and Papalia and Hooper (1971)
proposed and investigated the theoretical distinction between identity and
equivalence judgments in conservation tasks. The first is assessed by pre-
senting two objects which are equal both in physical appearance and criteria
content, such as weight, the second by deforming the appearance of one of the
objects. The above-mentioned authors have argued that lack of conservation
is, generally, tested by demonstrating failure in equivalence judgments
without prior assessment of identity judgments. The conceptual distinction
proposed and the results reported do not need to be elaborated here. Our
own discussion is exclusively concerned with the identity relation. In
contrast to formal interpretations, we emphasize that under deformation the
two objects are identical (e.g., in regard to their substance) but, at the
same time, are not identical (e.g., in regard to their form).
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7Hegel's developmental theory is based upon the same paradigm from which
Rubinstein's interpretations have been derived. It starts with the delinea-
tion of three~ essentially~ cognitive stages ~ut~ then~ continues with the
description of stages of social interactions. Most notably, cognition and
social processes are not as firmly separated in Hegel's theory as modern
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Figure le Sc.hematic Representation of Fi'lS Developmental P€r;{.~)d;~
for Piaget'a Extended Theory of Cognitive De~elo~~e~t.
